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Research on the semantics of number has been strongly inﬂuenced by the distri-
bution of overt number morphology in English. As is well know, number can be
expressed on nouns and on verbs in English. In example (1), overt plural morphol-
ogy is present in both places.
(1) The books-[PL] were-[PL] lying on the table.
All research on plurality has assumed the the [Pl]-feature on the noun is interpreted
in some way. Bennett (1974) was the ﬁrst to propose a semantics of number along
these line, and this assumption has been adopted by all subsequent research. Fur-
thermore most research has followed Bennett to assume that the [Pl]-feature on the
verb remains uninterpreted in English, and is a reﬂex of syntactic agreement with
the subject.1 A contemporary version of Bennett’s proposal (e.g. Chierchia 1998b,
Schwarzschild 1996) assigns to the singular noun book a set of individuals as its
extension, while the extension of the plural noun books includes groups of these in-
dividuals (and, for Schwarzschild, atomic individuals, as well). These denotations
are illustrated in (2):2
(2) a. [[book]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[books]] = {a⊕b⊕c, a⊕b, a⊕c,...}
However, in many languages, overt plural morphology is also found on the
determiner as shown by the German example (3a). Even in English plurality is also
expressed on demonstrative determiners as in (3b).
(3) a. Die
the-[Pl]
B¨ ucher
books-[Pl]
lagen
were lying-[Pl]
auf
on
dem
the
Tisch.
table
(German)
b. These books were lying on the table. (English)
Such facts indicate that other options should be considered for the question of de-
termining which [Pl] features have semantic content.
In this paper, I will argue that even German does not express morpholog-
ically the [Pl]-feature that is interpreted. I propose that there is another syntactic
head above the determiner, which I call the φ-head, and that the only semantically
contentful number features are contained in this head. Furthermore, I will argue
that [Pl] on nouns is not interpreted, but is a reﬂex of syntactic agreement with a
φ-head, just like [Pl] on adjectives, verbs, and determiners. There have to be two
agreement processes, one to establish agreement in the DP between N, A, D, and
the φ-head. The other one to establish agreement between the ﬁnite verb and a φP
in the subject position.
I ﬁrst present my proposal in all detail, and then present two argumentsfor presuppositional account of number (Sections 2 and 3). In Section 4 and 5, I
account for number marking with quantiﬁers and indeﬁnites respectively. Sections
6 and 7 extend the proposal to other agreement features. Section 8 is the conclusion.
1. The Proposal
Consider ﬁrst the syntactic properties of the φ-heads, which I claim host the se-
mantically contentful agreement features. I assume that φ in English and German
selects for a DP as its complement. This is illustrated in (4):
(4) the book
φP
 
  
φ
[Sg/Pl]
DP
   
D
   
the
NP
  	 	
books
Syntactically any φ-head can combine with any DP regardless of its feature
content. The number features of the φ head are licensed solely by the semantics.
The number features on the φ-head, however, license uninterpreted number features
in other places via syntactic agreement. In English and German, we ﬁnd agreement
between the noun, the determiner, and the φ-head, as well as between verbal inﬂec-
tion (T) and the φ-head of the subject.
The need to license uninterpreted number features by agreement predicts a
speciﬁc distribution of φ-heads in English and German. Namely, any DP must be
embedded below a φ head for the agreement requirements of N and D. Furthermore,
any T requires a φP in its speciﬁer to satisfy its agreement requirements. I will
assume that there are some locality conditions on syntactic agreement that predict
that DPs must actually be the sister of a φ-head. For DP-coordinations in subject
position, then, these conditions predict the distribution of φ-heads illustrated in (5).
(5) Kai and Lina are playing together.
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Now consider the semantic licensing of the feature content of φ. I assume
that the agreement features in φ are always interpreted as presuppositions. Specif-
ically, I propose that [Sg] expresses the presupposition “my sister denotes an atomor a mass”, while I assume that [Pl] has no inherent presupposition. More formally,
I assume the lexical entries in (6):3
(6) a. [[Sg]] = id{x∈De|¬∃a(atom(w)(a)∧ax∧a =x)}
b. [[Pl]] = idDe
On this proposal, the distribution of [Pl] is not constrained by an inherent presuppo-
sition. It is, however, predicted to be constrained by the general maxim Maximize
Presupposition that Heim (1991) argues for. This pragmatic maxim claims that, of
two lexical items, which lead to the same truth conditions in all cases where both
of their presuppositions are satisﬁed, the item with stronger presuppositions must
be used. For the case of presuppositional agreement features, the maxim therefore
predicts the condition in (7):
(7) Use the most speciﬁc agreement feature possible whose presupposition is
satisﬁed.
One application of this principle is in (8). (7) blocks (8a) because instead of
the presupposition-less [Pl]-feature the more speciﬁc, presuppositional [Sg] feature
can be used in this sentence. Then [Sg] must be used to satisfy (7).
(8) a. ∗John are here.
b. John is here.
The semantic deﬁnition of the [Sg]-feature raises the question of what ex-
actly is an atom? While in most cases this seems very clear (e.g. that John in (8)
is an atom), there are some cases are not fully speciﬁed by the semantics. For ex-
ample, Bloomﬁeld apparently remarked that ‘Pants are singular on one end, and
plural on the other.’ In the borderline cases, factors I do not fully understand decide
whether something is an atom or not. English consistently choses the plural, while
German uses the singular, in the following:
(9) a. English: the scissors, the pliers, the pants
b. German: die Schere, die Zange, die Hose
My proposal predicts that such inherent units of two into a single individual should
be a grey area of number licensing. Another such grey area are group denoting
nouns like committee and team. The factors determining atomicity in these cases
should maybe be called conventions, and are not directly part of my semantic li-
censing. Whatever the status of these conventions, I believe will not affect my
discussion in the following.2. Coordinations and Pronouns
2.1. The Number Feature of Coordinations
The evidence from coordination and pronouns in this section shows that the presup-
positional number features I propose are needed to explain the distribution of plural
agreement on the verb.4 Consider ﬁrst the coordination in (10) (repeated from (5)).
(10) Kai and Lina are playing.
Because Kai and Lina are two atoms while their mereological sum (the denotation
of the coordination) is not, the only number features that are semantically licensed
are the following:
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On my proposal, the plural feature of the coordination is licensed as a pre-
supposition on the individual denoted by the coordination. I do not see an alterna-
tive to this proposal: Because each conjunct is singular, the [Pl]-feature could not
be percolated up in some syntactic fashion from the conjuncts. Another attempt I
have seen proposed is that the conjunction and has inherently a [Pl]-feature (Vanek
1977). However, that proposal cannot explain why singular agreement is possible
in cases like (11):
(11) a. Strawberries and cream is on the menu.
b. Beans and rice is a basic staple around here.
Singular agreement with a conjunction seems possible when the denotation of the
conjunction can be viewed as an atomic individual; speciﬁcally, a dish in (11).
With the indeﬁnites in (11a), this condition should predict that the combination
of [Sg] with [Strawberries and cream] presupposes that the combination of some
strawberries and some cream yields an atomic individual. Indeed this will be the
prediction from the account of indeﬁnites I present in Section 5 below.
Two similar examples that do not involve indeﬁnites are given in (12). The
use of a collective predicate, marginally allows singular agreement, and there is a
clear contrast with (10) above. My proposal predicts this behavior because in (12)
it is salient to regard the subject’s denotation as an atom.
(12) a. ?Kai and Lina makes a good combination.
b. ?Tim and Sarah is a nice couple.2.2. Pronouns
A second case, where agreement features must be interpreted as presuppositions
are (unbound) pronouns.5 This proposal goes back to Cooper (1983). Cooper’s
proposal for pronouns is a special case of my proposal for all DPs. Speciﬁcally, I
assume that the structure of ‘theyi’ is the following:
φP
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φ
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The index i is interpreted as the value the context dependent assignment
function provides for index i. The number morphology in φ introduces a presuppo-
sition on the context. Namely, in (12) it must be non-atomic.
The non-atomicity presupposition is, in fact, on my proposal derived indi-
rectly from Heim’s (1991) Maximize Presupposition. The proposal predicts that the
non-atomicity presupposition will only be present if singular pronoun he/she/it is
not blocked by some independent factor. This aspect of my proposal is corroborated
by the following facts where the non-atomicity presupposition is absent.
In English, consider cases like (13), which are at least in some dialects of
English acceptable. In these dialects, the singular pronouns are blocked in cases
where the gender of the individual talked about is unknown.
(13) Some student left their umbrella.
A more frequent reason a singular pronoun is blocked is for politeness. For
example, it is impolite to address a stranger, especially an older one, by using the
second person singular in many languages. In French, the second person plural
vous is used instead of the singular in such a situation. In German, usually the third
person plural is used as the polite form and the second person plural could only be
used for royalty. Consider the German data in (14):
(14) a. K¨ onnten
could
Sie
they
bitte
please
etwas
a little
r¨ ucken!
move
b. Eure
your
Majest¨ at
majesty
haben
have
euren
your
Silberl¨ offel
silver spoon
geschluckt.
swallowed
My proposal allows the use of the plural form in examples like (14) since in these
cases a politeness consideration blocks the use of the singular, and therefore the
Heim’s maxim is satisﬁed by the use of the plural which has no inherent presuppo-
sition. Since I argue in section 6 that the third Person features is like [Pl] without
inherent presupposition, the shift from second to third person in (14a) can be ex-
plained in the same way.
My proposal predicts that generally if a language has politeness constraints
on pronoun use, the forms that should surface as the polite forms should be thosewith a less speciﬁc inherent presupposition. Speciﬁcally, as polite forms replac-
ing the second person singular, only be the second and third person plural and the
third person singular should be possible. Tilman Berger (p.c.) points out that Head
(1978), which I unfortunately was unable to consult so far, claims that there is in-
deed such a generalization concerning politeness phenomena.
3. Deﬁnites
While the arguments in the previous section established that there are presupposi-
tional number features with the interpretation that I propose, this section seeks to
establish that number marking on nouns cannot be consistently interpreted.
Consider ﬁrst two accounts of number marking on deﬁnites: the standard
proposal (Bennett 1974, Link 1983, Verkuyl 1981 and others) and my proposal.
The fact I would like to consider is (15):
(15) The students wrote a paper.
Plural semantics always requires some version of a distributivity operator. I
adopt one proposal here for concreteness, though I believe that for my present pur-
poses nothing will depend on the details. I assume that the distributivity operator
applies to one-place predicates and is syntactically represented as a ∗. The seman-
tics of the *-operator is given in (16) with the auxiliary concept Cover deﬁned in
(17).
(16) ∗P(X)=1iff. there is a cover C of X with P(x)=1for every x in C
(17) A set of individuals C is a Cover for X iff.

C = X
The *-operator can apply to NP and VP equally. For example, if the denotations of
NP and VP were as in (18a) and (18c), the denotations of the starred predicates are
as in (18b) and (18d).
(18) a. [[student]] = {Tom, Tina, Tanja}
b. [[*student]] = {Tom, Tina, Tanja, Tom⊕Tina, Tom⊕Tanja, Tina⊕Tanja,
Tom⊕Tina⊕Tanja}
c. [[wrote a paper]] = {Tom, Tom⊕Tina, Tanja}
d. [[*(wrote a paper)]] = {Tom, Tanja, Tom⊕Tina, Tom⊕Tanja,
Tom⊕Tina⊕Tanja}
The standard proposal claims that plurality on the noun is interpreted as the *-
operator. Hence, (18b) is the denotation of the students. The deﬁnite determiner
selects the maximal element from this set, the group of Tom, Tina, and Tanja. On
the VP, on the other hand, the *-operator has no morphological reﬂex according to
the standard theory. Hence, (18d) is a possible interpretation of the VP. Since (18d)
has the group of all three students as one of its elements, the standard proposal
predicts (15) to be true. Moreover it predicts that the singular could not be usedin this scenario because (18a), the denotation of the singular noun according to the
standard proposal, has no maximal element.
Why can (15) not be used in a situation with just one student? The deﬁnition
of the * in (16) predicts that student and *student have the same interpretation if
there is only one student.6 Therefore, the standard approach appeals to a pragmatic
condition similar to the one my approach relies on: Do not use the plural if the
resulting meaning is identical to the meaning of the singular in the present context.
Now consider my proposal for (15). On my proposal, the *-operator can be
applied to any predicate and is never pronounced. In the scenario characterized by
(17), the *-operator must apply to the noun since otherwise the set denoted by the
NP has no maximal element, and the deﬁnite determiner presupposes the existence
of such a maximal element. The result of combining the with (18b) is again the
group of all three students. Because this is a non-atomic individual the φ-head
above the deﬁnite determiner cannot contain the feature [Sg], and therefore must
contain [Pl]. Syntactic agreement between φ and the noun predicts then that only
the plural noun form as in (15) is possible in this scenario.
If, however, there is only a single salient student, the complement of φ
would denote this single atomic individual. In such a situation, the presupposi-
tion of [Sg] would be satisﬁed, and therefore the [Pl]-feature would be blocked by
Heim’s maxim (7). In this way, my account predicts the (15) cannot be used when
there is only one student.
In sum, both proposals provide accounts for the interpretation of (15) that
are of roughly equal complexity. Now consider examples that allow a cumulative
interpretation of the noun:
(19) a. The daughters of the defense players/Bill and James ...
b. The residents of these cities ...
c. The winners of a gold medal at the 1992 and 1996 olympics ...
Beck (2000) argues that the *-operator alone cannot predict the correct semantics
for these examples. Consider the interpretation that arises from applying the *-
operator to the NP of (19a) as in (20). The denotation of (20) is the maximal group
of females that are the daughter of Bill and also the daughter of James, which is
certainly not the salient interpretation of (19a).
(20) the *(daughter of Bill and James)
The salient interpretation of (19) involves cumulation of the predicate daughter as
in (21). I adopt an account of cumulation based on the **-operator (Krifka 1986,
Sternefeld 1998, Beck and Sauerland 2000). The result of cumulation is shown in
(21):
(21) **daughter(X)(Y )=1iff. there are both
a. a cover CX of X, such that ∀x ∈ CX ∃y   Y : daughter(x)(y)=1 ,
b. and a cover CY of Y, such that ∀y ∈ CY ∃x   X: daughter(x)(y)=1 .In the concrete scenario of (22a), cumulation of the daughter relation adds one pair
to the relation as shown in (22b).
(22) a. daughter = { DB, Bill ,  DJ, James }
b. **daughter = { DB, Bill ,  DJ, James ,  DB ⊕ DJ, Bill ⊕ James }
Hence, the expression in (23) predicts the right interpretation for Beck’s example,
namely the group of all females that are either the daughter of Bill or the daughter
of James.
(23) the [**daughter](Bill⊕James)
Notethat(23)doesnotrequirethedistributive*-operator; thecumulative**-operator
is sufﬁcient. Plurality in (23) can therefore not be interpreted as the *-operator.
Beck (2000) suggests that the [Pl]-feature on nouns is ambiguous between the *-
operator and the **-operator, and that furthermore the **-operator when it applies
to nouns must be morphologically realized as plural morphology.
Beck’s proposal, however, cannot account for examples like (24) where a
singular noun allows a cumulative interpretation. For example, (24a) can be used
in a situation where the defense players have no common daughter. (I provide a full
account of (24) on my proposal in the next section.)
(24) a. Every daughter of the defense players is watching the game.
b. Every winner of a gold medal at these events can be proud.
c. Every resident of these cities has a bicycle.
I conclude therefore that the standard account of plurality cannot predict why a
cumulated noun in a deﬁnite description must be plural.
My account, on the other hand, predicts this fact straightforwardly: I as-
sume that the **-operator just like the *-operator is always silent and can apply to
any binary predicate. Since the deﬁnite in (25) refers to a non-atomic individual
– the group of the two daughters in scenario (22) –, the φ-head above the deﬁnite
description must contain the [Pl]-feature, which then triggers plural agreement on
the noun.
(25) [Pl] the ([**daughter] of Bill and James)
In this section, I have established that [Pl] on nouns must not be inter-
pretable, which is incompatible with the standard proposal on how number mor-
phology is interpreted.
4. Quantiﬁers
In the two subsequent sections, I investigate how number morphology with other
noun phrases can be accounted for on my proposal. In this section, I consider
singular universals as in (26).(26) a. Every boy is singing.
b. Jeder
every
Junge
boy
singt.
is singing
(German)
On my proposal, quantiﬁers cannot be interpreted within φP because φ can
only take an argument of type e. Therefore, all quantiﬁers must scope out from the
position below φ. I assume that this is done by syntactic movement as in (27):
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In (26), the presupposition of the [Sg]-feature is projected to the λ-predicate
that forms the scope of the universal. I assume that universal quantiﬁers project pre-
suppositions from their scope ‘universally’ as deﬁned in (27), i.e. to each individual
that satisﬁes the restrictor of the universal (Heim 1983).
(27) every(R)(S) is deﬁned iff. ∀x : R(x) → x ∈ domain(S)
I argue below that every must be decomposed into the two morphemes in (30). A
consequence of the proposal is that the semantics of every restricts the range of
quantiﬁcation to atomic individuals. It follows that only [Sg] can occur in φ in (27).
Now consider the cumulative example in (28), which is repeated from (24)
above.
(28) Every resident of these cities has a bicycle.
Assume that Amsterdam and Berlin are the two relevant cities, and that a1 and a2
are Amsterdam’s residents, while b1 and b2 are the residents of Berlin. Cumulation
of in the NP yields (29).
(29) **resident(Amsterdam⊕Berlin)={a1⊕b1,a 2⊕b1,a 1⊕b2,a 2⊕b2,a 1⊕a2⊕b1,
a1⊕a2⊕b2,a 1⊕b1⊕b2,a 2⊕b1⊕b2,a 1⊕a2⊕b1⊕b2}
Applyingauniversalquantiﬁerdirectlyto(29)yieldsaninterpretationthatisclearly
wrong. Namely, it would require every group of individuals listed in (29) to one a
bicycle.
I propose therefore to decompose every into two parts deﬁnite DER and
a quantiﬁer part JE. Applying the deﬁnite determiner to (29) yields the maximal
group of that set as in (30a). The lexical entry for the universal in (30) then quanti-
ﬁes over the atomic parts of a group individual.(30) JE DER resident of these cities
a. [[DER resident of these cities]] =a 1⊕a2⊕a3⊕···⊕b1⊕b2⊕···
b. [[JE]](X)(P)isdeﬁnediff.∀x :( atom(x)∧x  X) → x ∈ domain(P)
where deﬁned: [[JE]](X)(P)=1 iff. ∀x :( atom(x)∧ x  X) → P(x)
Matthewson (2001) independently proposes the semantics of universal quantiﬁers
in (30) based on evidence from a Salish language. She concludes that her semantics
should also be correct for English every, but solely based a principle of semantic
uniformity she puts forth. My consideration of cumulative nouns under universals,
hence, provides direct empirical evidence for her proposal. A further argument for
the proposal is that it predicts the existence presupposition of every.
The Salish language Matthewson discusses differs from English in that the
noun head in the complement of a universal quantiﬁer bears plural morphology.
This, on my proposal, indicates that in this Salish language a φ-head must occur
below JE, while in English it occurs only above JE.
The need for of QR of a DP scoping it out of φP argues for my proposal that
the interpreted number feature is syntactically separate from D. However the pos-
sibility of QR must be blocked with conjunctions and deﬁnites: Otherwise QR of a
conjunction or deﬁnite followed by the insertion of a distributivity operator would
predict singular morphology to be compatible with conjunctions and deﬁnites. For
example, in the representation (31) the [Sg]-feature can be licensed.
(31) [the books] *λx. ([Sg]x) is lying on the table
But, QR of deﬁnites and conjunctions is ruled out by Fox’s (2000) Scope Economy,
since the resulting interpretation would also be available without this instance of
QR by applying the *-operator to the VP.7 QR of every-DPs, on the other hand,
does not violate Scope Economy as it is the only way to generate an interpretable
LF-representation.
My proposal entails that any language that has number morphology and
quantiﬁersmustallowQR.Therefore, thepresenceofagreementmorphologymight
serve as a trigger for language learners to acquire quantiﬁer raising. This would
explain the contrast between German and Japanese inverse linking constructions—
that German allows inverse linking in (32a), but Japanese in (32b) does not:8
(32) a. Ein
one
Koffer
suitcase
von
of
jedem
everyone
b. daremo-no
everyone-GEN
kaban-wa
suitcase-TOP
The projection of number presuppositions from the scope of universals pro-
vides also a further argument for my claim that [Pl] is semantically empty. Consider
the examples in (33):
(33) a. Every boy should invite his sister.
b. Every boy should invite his sisters.The singular (33a) is only acceptable when each of the relevant boys has exactly
one sister. The plural (33b), however, is not restricted to situations where each boy
has multiple sisters. It can also be used in mixed situations where some of the boys
have more than one sister, while the others have only one sister.
This difference between [Sg] and [Pl] follows from my proposal. The inher-
ent presupposition of [Sg] projects universally. His sisters in (33b) has an inherent
existence presupposition, which again projects universally, but no number presup-
position. A further presupposition of [Pl], however, is derived from principle (7)
by a computation comparing the presupposition of (33b) with that of (33a). This
computation is similar to a proposal I have developed for implicatures (Sauerland
2002b). The result is that the sentence (33b) can be used whenever the presuppo-
sition of (33a) is not satisﬁed and the inherent existence presupposition is. This
predicts that (33b) presupposes that each boy has at least one sister and that at least
one boy has two or more sisters.
For reasons of space, I cannot address number marking with Hackl’s (2000)
comparative quantiﬁers in detail here. I expect that, once his decomposition ap-
proach is adopted, no particular problems arise. The idea would be that (34a) is an
indeﬁnite, which the next section covers. (34b), on the other hand, should be ana-
lyzed as the number n such that n many books are on the table is 1.0. In this case,
the uniqueness presupposition of the singular wouldrender the assertion contingent,
which I assume is blocked.9
(34) a. One book is on the table.
b. 1.0 books are on the table.
5. Positive and Negative Indeﬁnites
The semantics of indeﬁnites and bare plurals is a widely and very controversially
discussed topic (Carlson 1977, Wilkinson 1991, Krifka et al. 1995, and others). It
seems to me that only some of the proposals for the semantics of indeﬁnites are
compatible with my ideas about number, but this is also a question that needs more
investigation. The analysis I present in the following assumes with Krifka et al.
(1995)thatindeﬁnitesandbarepluralscanbothbeanalyzedexistentialquantiﬁers.10,11
If indeﬁnites are existentials, then they must scope out to a position above φP for
type reasons just like the universal quantiﬁer in the previous section. Therefore, the
number presupposition enters the sentence meaning in the scope of the existential.
Consider ﬁrst how presuppositions generally are projected from the scope
argument of an indeﬁnite. I assume that an existential presupposition projects, as
captured by the lexical entry for a in (35) (and similarly for one and some).
(35) [[a]](R)(S) is deﬁned iff. ∃x: R(x)=1∧x ∈ domain(S)
where deﬁned [[a]](R)(S)=1iff. ∃x: R(x)=1 ∧S(x)=1
Note that the term S(x)=1in line 2 of (35) implies that x ∈ domain(S). There-
fore, a presupposition of S makes a non-trivial contribution to the truth-conditionsof an existential statement.
For an illustration, consider (36) from Karttunen and Peters (1979:53). For
now, just consider the presupposition of x managed to Y that Y was difﬁcult for x.
Then, (35) predicts the presupposition that it was difﬁcult for someone to succeed
George V—an essentially vacuous presupposition since obtaining the succession
was difﬁcult for anybody but the crown-prince. Furthermore, (36) is true if there is
someone such that it was hard for him to succeed George V and he actually did it.12
(36) Someone managed to succeed George V on the throne of England.
Now consider the effect of number on an existential. (37) and (38) show a
singular and plural sentence with their predicted presupposition and assertion.
(37) a. Lina harvested a tomato.
b. Presupposition: ∃x: atom(x) ∧ [*tomato](x)
c. Assertion: ∃x: atom(x) ∧ [*tomato](x) ∧ Lina harvested x.
(38) a. Lina harvested tomatoes.
b. Presupposition: ∅
c. Assertion: ∃x: [*tomato](x) ∧ Lina harvested x
The predictions for (37) are, as far as I can see, accurate. However, the predicted
assertion in (38c) is too weak: It is incorrectly true if Lina harvested only one
tomato. Here is one way to derive a stronger assertion: Heim’s principle (7) predicts
that (38a) has (39) as a further presupposition.
(39) Implicated Presupposition: ¬∃x: atom(x) ∧ [*tomato](x)
Now apply the reasoning schema ∃xA(x), ¬∃xB(x) |= ∃x:A(x)&¬B(x) to (38c)
and (39). The result in (40) is the desired stronger assertion with ¬atomic(x)i nt h e
scope of the existential.
(40) ∃x: [*tomato](x) ∧ Lina harvested x ∧¬ atomic(x)
This lineof reasoningmust proceedwithout takingthe distributivityof thepredicate
tomato into account (∃x tomato(x) →∃ x: tomato(x) ∧ atomic(x)). I assume this is
done only later, at which point (39) is canceled because it contradicts the assertion
(38c). Crucially though, the strengthened assertion (40) can remain.
My reason for this derivation of (40) are negated indeﬁnites. Negated in-
deﬁnites have been used by a number of people including Schwarzschild (1996) to
argue for the weak semantics of the plural that, in a different way, I advocate as
well. A case in point is the fact that the plural examples in (41b) entail the singular
examples in (41a). (I assume that ‘no’ is decomposed into sentential negation and
an indeﬁnite (Penka 2002).)
(41) a. Lina didn’t harvest a tomato. / Lina harvested no tomato.
b. Lina didn’t harvest tomatoes. / Lina harvested no tomatoes.
The entailment from (41b) to (41a) would be blocked if ¬atomic(x) was added tothe assertion of (41b) in the scope of the existential. But, a derivation along the lines
of (40) is blocked in this case: The two premises of the derivation of (40) were the
presupposition of the singular example, and the assertion of the plural example.
Consider these two parts of the analysis of (41):
(42) a. Presupposition of (41a): ∃x: atom(x) ∧ [*tomato](x)
b. Assertion of (41b): ¬∃ x: [*tomato](x) ∧ Lina harvested x
Because the assertion is negated while the presupposition is not, an entailment anal-
ogous to (40) cannot be drawn from (42). Therefore, (42b) is predicted to entail
(42a).
6. Other Agreement Features
I believe my proposal can be extended to other agreement features. Consider ﬁrst
person agreement with coordinations in German:
(43) a. Ich
I
und
and
Du
you
sollten
should-1st-Pl
uns
us
gegenseitig
mutually
helfen.
help
b. Du
You
und
and
Tina
Tina
solltet
should-2nd-Pl
euch
you
gegenseitig
mutually
helfen.
help
c. Tina
Tina
und
and
Tom
Tom
sollten
should
sich
self
gegenseitig
mutually
helfen.
help
The agreement morphology of the verb in (43) is determined by the entire coor-
dination, not just by one of the coordinated forms. This is expected if the φ-head
above the coordination also must contain a Person feature. The lexical entries of
the person features in (44) then predict the data in (43):
(44) a. [[1st]] =i d {x |speaker ∩x  = ∅}
b. [[2nd]] =i d {x |participants ∩x  = ∅}
c. [[3rd]] =i d De
Gender in Czech shows the same regularity. Consider the facts in (45)
(Vanek 1977:31). These follow if masculine gender is vacuous, feminine presup-
poses non-masculinity, and neuter presupposes genderlessness.
(45) a. Jan
Jan
a
and
Petr
Peter
ˇ sli
went-masc-pl
do
to
biografu
the movies
b. Vˇ era
Vera
a
and
Barbara
Barbara
ˇ sly
went-fem-pl
do
to
biografu
the movies
c. Jan
Jan
a
and
Vˇ era
Vera
ˇ sli/∗ˇ sly
went-masc-pl
do
to
biografu
the movies
d. Matka
Mother
a
and
jej´ ı
her
d´ ıtˇ e
child-neut
ˇ sly
went-fem-pl
do
to
biografu
the moviese. Otec
Father
a
and
jeho
his
d´ ıtˇ e-neut
child
ˇ sli
went-masc-pl
do
to
biografu
the movies
7. The Feature-Subset Principle
I have always given an empty semantics for one of the features. In fact, I would like
to postulate the general principle.
(46) If F1 and F2 are two presuppositional features that can be inserted in the
same syntactic position, then they must stand in a subset relationship (i.e.
domain(F1) ⊂ domain(F2) or domain(F2) ⊂ domain(F1)).
I have given three arguments for the weak semantics of the plural that is entailed
by (46):13 the use of plural pronouns for politely addressing a singular person in
various languages in Section 2.2, the weak existential presupposition of the plural
in the scope of a universal in Section 4, and the entailment from plural negated
indeﬁnites to the singular in 5. Of these three arguments, the ﬁrst one can also
be used to argue for the weak semantics of third person, since in languages like
German as third person form is used instead of you for a polite address. The ar-
gument from presupposition projection with universals can be used widely to ﬁnd
support for principle (46). In (47), I give examples from the non-participant pre-
supposition of third Person, the non-past presupposition of the present tense, and
the anti-uniqueness presupposition of the indeﬁnite (Heim 1991).14
(47) a. Everyone of us should remember that he is partially responsible .
b. Every Sunday, John fasts. (Sauerland 2002a)
c. Every candidate should sent a paper of his.
8. Conclusion
My main claim in this paper was that the treatment of plurality requires a presuppo-
sitional account of agreement. I have shown in Section 2 that such presuppositional
account is necessary for coordinations and pronouns. In Section 3, I have shown
that my account also is the only one that can explain the number marking on deﬁnite
descriptions. These two arguments are then the arguments for my claim.
I hope to have shown in section 4 through 7 that the semantic licensing
account of agreement raises interesting semantic questions about the interaction of
presuppositions and implicatures. In particular, the facts with indeﬁnites in section
5 are still puzzling to me.Endnotes
This material developed through presentations at the Semantics Reading Group
in Northampton, Massachusetts, the Universit¨ at Stuttgart, the University of Penn-
sylvania, the University of Delaware, the SALT 13 conference at the University
of Washington in Seattle, and the Zentrum f¨ ur allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft in
Berlin. I would like to thank the audiences at these events for their many helpful
comments, as well as Irene Heim, Ji-Yung Kim, Tilman Berger, Tom Roeper, and
Ede Zimmermann for further helpful comments. The German Research Council
is currently funding me as an Emmy-Noether-Fellow (Grant SA 925/1-1), which I
gratefully acknowledge.
1. Dowty and Jacobson (1989) propose that singular verb morphology be in-
terpreted as a presupposition that the argument of the verb be atomic, and the plural
as a complementray non-atomicity presupposition. The proposal, however, seems
to run afoul examples where the subject is plural, but receives a distributive inter-
pretation. (i) is a particular dramatic case of this:
(i) They each believe that they are the only person in the room.
Kerstin Schwabe (p.c.) points out though that the possibility of (optional) plural
agreement in German leftward gapping, as in (ii), might provide an argument for
semantic licensing of verbal agreement (Schwabe and von Heusinger 2001). How-
ever, the syntactic struture of such examples is far from clear.
(ii) ...,
...,
weil
because
er
he
ein
a
Buch
book
und
and
sie
she
eine
a
DVD
DVD
gekauft
bought
hat/haben.
has/have
2. I assume a standard mereological ontology for groups as, for example, that
of Schwarzschild (1996). The domain of individuals contains both single individu-
als and groups of individuals. I use ⊕ to indicate the mereological sum, and   to
indicate the part-of relationship.
3. Since what is a single individual in one world, can have a plural counterpart
in another, the number morpheme must also have a world argument position. The
examples in (i) show that the world argument position of the number morpheme
must be covalued with the world argument position of the noun it immediately c-
commands:
(i) Scenario: Kai hears noises from the basement and assumes that there are two
monsters in the basement. Actually, his mother is down there making the
noises.
a. Kai believes the monsters are dangerous.
b. Kai believes his mother is dangerous.
c. ∗Kai believes the monster is dangerous.
d. ∗Kai believes his mothers are dangerous.
4. I focus here on DP coordinations which provide a direct argument for my
approach. See Heycock and Zamparelli (2003) for a recent investigation into co-ordination below DP. Peter Staudacher (p.c.) pointed out example (i) to me which
seems to be a DP coordination, but is nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper.
(i) Every boy and every girl who met each other at the station went out.
5. I assume with Heim (1994) and others, that agreement features on bound
pronouns are not interpreted because of examples such as (i) in footnote (ii).
6. Chierchia(1998b)proposesadeﬁnitionofthe*-operatorthatexcludesatomic
individuals from the resulting set. The argument I develop below against the stan-
dard approach also argues Chierchia’s version of it. Furthermore, I show in sections
2.2 and 7 that generally the plural must include the singular.
7. Examples like (i) marginally allow a construal where the object takes dis-
tributive wide scope over the subject, which is possibly the result of QR of the
object. But, a pronoun bound by the object must bear plural agreement indicating
the John and Bill must bear the [Pl]-feature.
(i) Someone told [John and Bill]i about the things theiri/*hisi son had said.
If this description is correct, it shows that, though QR of the object seems to be
possible, [Sg] is still not licensed. This though is also predicted by Fox’s condition
because QR of φP and QR of DP result in the same interpretation, but QR of φPi s
shorter and hence preferred by his economy condition. Licensing of [Sg], however,
is only possible if DP QRs.
8. Penka Stateva (p.c.) points out that Japanese does allow non-surface scope
of the superlative morpheme. Hence, it seems that only the availability of QR of
DPs in a language must be triggered by the presence of overt agreement.
9. Here are some more puzzling facts that various people have pointed out
to me. In Turkish and Hungarian cardinals generally trigger singular agreement.
In German, only cardinals that end in one trigger singular agreement. While I
have at present nothing to say about the former, observe that, in German, actually
the numerals ending in one actually only trigger singular agreement when not the
numeral eins (‘one’), but the indeﬁnite ein (‘a’) is used as shown by (i). I propose
that ‘tausendundeine Nacht’ must be derived by NP ellipsis from ‘tausend N¨ achte
und eine Nacht’.
(i) a. Tausendundeine
thousand-and-a
Nacht
nights
ist/sind
is/are
vergangen.
passed
b. Tausendundeins
thousand-and-one
N¨ achte
nights
*ist/sind
*is/are
vergangen.
passed
10. I leave predicative indeﬁnites for future research. Example (i) shows that
number is not predicted by subject-predicate agreement with predicative indeﬁnites.
(i) Kai and Lina both believe that they are a tiger.
11. English is one of the languages that allows bare plurals as the argument of
kind predicates (see (a)), though other indeﬁnites cannot occur there (see (ib)). Ifbare nouns are kind denoting, there is still a question why these kinds are plural
while (ic) requires singular.
(i) a. Neanderthals are extinct.
b. #Some Neanderthals are extinct.
c. The Neanderthal is extinct.
Possibly, bare plural kinds are derived by a kind-formation operator that applies to
φP (cf. Chierchia 1998a).
12. The account here hence avoids the ‘requantiﬁcation’ problem Karttunen and
Peters (1979) discuss. It would interesting to investigate whether a similar account
can be given for the requantiﬁcation problem of von Fintel (1995) in focus seman-
tics. He points out that standard focus semantics predicts for examples like (i)
a wrong interpretation that can be paraphrased as: ‘Whenever property owners do
somethingtoatrespasser, propertyownersshootata(possiblydifferent)trespasser.’
(i) In the US, property owners always shoot at a trespasser.
Von Fintel presents a situation semantic solution for the problem, but an alternative
account based on a presuppositional semantics of focus might be possible.
13. (47) would also be satisﬁed if [Sg] was semantically vacuous, and [Pl] con-
tentful. It is an empirical fact that [Pl] is semantically unmarked. Interestingly,
morphologically [Sg] seems to be unmarked.
14. For (48c) consider this scenario: Several candidates applied. Some have
written only one paper, others have written more than one. The selection committee
decides ... While (48c) is acceptable, (i) is not:
(i) #Every candidate should sent the paper of his.
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